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Abstract
We consider the optimal design of ￿ exible use in a digital-rights-management policy. The
basic model considers a single distributor of digital goods and a continuum of consumers. Each
consumer can acquire the digital good either as a licensed product or as an unlicensed copy.
The availablity of (or access to) unlicensed copies is increasing both in the number of licensed
copies and in the ￿ exibility accorded to licensed copies. We thus analyze the optimal design of
￿ exibility in the presence of unlicensed distribution channels (the ￿greynet￿ ).
We augment the basic model by introducing a ￿secure platform￿ that is required to use
the digital good. We compare the optimal design of ￿ exibility in the presence of a platform to
the one without a platform. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium provision when platform and
content are complementary goods but are distributed and priced by di⁄erent sellers.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The arrival of digital goods came with the promise of easy transferability and portability across
various media and devices. In fact, for a user of the digital goods, the corresponding ￿ exibility is
often an essential aspect of their valuation. Yet, for the provider of these goods, ￿ exibility comes
with the risk that unlicensed copies will circulate and undermine revenue-generating sales.
The objective of digital-rights-management (DRM) technologies is to enable the providers of
digital goods to control the details of how consumers can use the good. In many current DRM
systems, the provider attempts to control the consumers￿use of the good along several dimensions.
Typical parameters include how long the consumer can use the good, how often he can use it, on
how many devices he can use it simultaneously, and whether he can copy or alter it in any way.
DRM systems can thus be viewed as a response by content providers intended to increase users￿
valuation of the content without risking additional sales.
The current paper aims to analyze the basic design of a DRM system as an optimal trade-o⁄
between the increase in the value of a licensed copy and the increase in the number of unlicensed
copies. Intuitively, an increase in the allowed ￿ exibility of a digital product increases the value of
the product for its user and hence will allow the seller to charge a higher price for a licensed copy.
On the other hand, with an increase in the ￿ exibility comes the risk that a non-paying customer
will get, legally or not, access to the digital good. Hence an increase in ￿ exibility may undermine
sales volume. We explicitly model the choice of ￿ exibility in an environment where perfect security
is only possible in the limit when ￿ exibility is severely restricted. This is meant to represent the
pervasive view that the Internet will always be a ￿greynet￿without perfect security provisions.1
We begin our analysis with a single content provider who o⁄ers a digital good to many con-
sumers. The consumers are ex ante identical and have to choose between acquiring a licensed copy
of the product and hoping to receive an unlicensed copy. The likelihood that the consumer will
be able to receive an unlicensed copy is increasing both in the number of licensed copies and in
their permitted ￿ exibility. The policy instruments of the content provider are price and permitted
￿ exibility. An increase in the ￿ exibility increases the revenue per item sold, but it also increases
the likelihood that a given consumer will obtain access to an unlicensed copy. The resulting equi-
librium policies of the content provider will attempt to ￿nd the optimal balance between ￿ exibility
and sales. In equilibrium, the ex ante identical agents will be split into buyers of licensed products
1We refer to ￿greynet￿here to describe the use of digital ￿les outside the strictly licensed context. This includes
both the use of unlicensed copies on a small scale and the possibility of ￿le sharing through peer-to-peer networks.
Biddle, England, Peinado & Willman (2003) used the term ￿darknet￿to describe exclusively peer-to-peer networks.Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 4
and consumers of unlicensed copies. The equilibrium volume of sales will be determined endoge-
nously by price and ￿ exibility. An important determinant of the equilibrium policies will be the
rate at which licensed copies translate into access to unlicensed copies. In reality, this may depend
on factors such as bandwidth of Internet links, social connectedness, and other technological as
well economic determinants. We then extend our analysis to heterogeneous buyers with either
di⁄erential valuations for the digital product or di⁄erential access rates to licensed copies.
In the case of online music sales, the most successful example is certainly Apple. It is currently
by far the dominant provider of high quality digital-music ￿les with its music store and playback
software iTunes. Under the iTunes DRM rules, each music ￿le can be played on ￿ve devices at
the same time that have to be authorized by the buyer of the ￿le. Individual ￿les can be burned
on CDs without restriction, but every playlist, i.e. speci￿c arrangement of several ￿les, can only
be burned seven times (see Inc (2005)). Apple￿ s success in selling music ￿les is closely connected
to its introduction of the portable music player iPod. In addition to having a hard disk with a
signi￿cantly larger storage capacity than the previously common ￿ ash memories, the iPod also
makes use of DRM technology. Only high quality ￿les bought from Apple and those extracted from
a user￿ s own CDs using the iTunes software can be played by an iPod.2
The software and hardware provided by Apple clearly represent complementary products to
the digital good. In the speci￿c case of iTunes and iPods, they represent a platform for the use of
the digital good that enhances the value of that good. At the same time, the digital goods sold
by Apple can be used only on the platform provided by Apple. The platform thus achieves two
objectives for Apple. It enhances the security of the DRM system itself, but it also restricts the
use of unlicensed copies. Even the unlicensed copies can essentially only be used on the Apple
platform. As a result, Apple as the platform provider can realize revenue from two sources: the
sales of the music ￿les and the sale of the platform (i.e. the hardware and associated software).
We therefore investigate the role of a platform in the context of DRM. We extend the model
to include a single provider that sells both a platform for his digital content and the content itself.
The products are o⁄ered jointly but priced separately. We make the assumption that, although
the digital good may be acquired in the form of an unlicensed copy, it will still have to run on
the platform sold by the content provider. This assumption completely removes concern about the
security of the platform, but the essential part of the argument only requires that the platform
be less susceptible to unlicensed appearance than the digital good itself. We then show that the
content provider who sells a platform will ￿nd it optimal to provide each user with a higher and
socially more e¢ cient level of ￿ exibility that the provider who doesn￿ t sell a platform. Indeed the
2The iPod also plays low quality ￿les as MP3 which certainly are no perfect substitutes for high quality ￿les.Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 5
arrival of the iPod and iTunes platform was accompanied by a much more ￿ exible DRM system
than the ones adopted earlier by the music industry itself.
The price of the digital good itself will be rather low, considering the high level of ￿ exibility,
and unlicensed copies will continue to circulate. However, the platform provider is less concerned
about the unlicensed segment of the market, because he can recover part of the surplus that arises
in the unlicensed segment through revenue from the sale of the platform itself. Consequently, the
price of the platform serves the same function as an entrance fee to an amusement park. Because
the content provider cannot extract all the surplus in the market for digital goods, he will leave
surplus to the consumers. Thus, he can charge a substantial price for the platform that gives the
consumers access to the market for digital goods. Note that this is a novel business model that
contrasts with the model employed in other markets of complementary goods in which customers
make a one-time purchase of a device and then make recurring purchases of items that complement
the device or subscribe to a complementary service. For example, Gillette makes money by selling
blades not razors, and integrated communications companies make money by signing up cell-phone
subscribers rather than by selling phones.
In reality, the digital good and the platform itself are often sold by di⁄erent vendors. In the
case of the audio ￿les, for example, the digital goods are sold by the record companies, whereas the
platform is provided by Apple in form of the iPod. The previous analysis of an integrated company
thus suggests that there is a natural con￿ ict between the owner of the digital good and the owner of
the platform. The owner of the digital good would like to increase the revenue-generating sales of
the good. For this reason, the content provider will want to reduce the ￿ exibility and increase the
price. On the other hand, the platform provider cares less about the revenue coming from the sales
of the digital good and more about the perceived value of the platform. He will therefore want to
increase the ￿ exibility of the DRM system, thus increasing the number of circulating copies of the
digital good, licensed or not, in order to sustain the market for the platform. We therefore conclude
with an analysis of the strategic interaction between content provider and platform provider in the
presence of complementarities between their products. We show that the resulting equilibrium will
lead to lower ￿ exibility, a higher number of sold copies of the digital good, and a lower price for the
platform. The con￿ ict between content provider and platform provider predicted by our model has
in fact emerged in recent discussions between Apple and the music industry. A recent article in the
Financial Times, 2/28/05, quotes an industry insider as saying ￿Our music is not something to be
given away to sell iPods.￿The concern is that the current price of the digital goods is too low and
generates revenue for the owner of the platform but not for the owner of the digital goods.
An open issue for future research is the role of competing platforms in the context of DRM. Most
other online music providers, e.g., Walmart, use Microsoft￿ s Windows Media Audio (WMA) ￿leFlexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 6
format and combine it either with Microsoft￿ s DRM-enabled player or one of their own. Exceptions
are Sony￿ s music store Connect (which has its own ￿le format ATRAC, combined with its own
DRM technology OpenMG) and RealNetworks￿RealPlayer Music Store (which o⁄ers ￿les in both
Apple￿ s format and Microsoft￿ s).
1.2 Related Literature
Several authors have put forth arguments about why piracy of easily reproducible goods might
be bene￿cial to providers as well as consumers, thus adding new aspects to the discussion about
copyright protection. Liebowitz (1985) was the ￿rst to show that, when each good is shared by a
de￿ned group of consumers (also called a ￿club￿ ), the provider can indirectly appropriate revenues
from all members of the group by charging a higher price. Varian (2000) ￿nds that piracy in
groups can be bene￿cial to the provider if sharing is cheaper than producing additional units, or
if it enables price discrimination based on consumers￿di⁄erent valuations. Bakos, Brynjolfsson &
Lichtman (1999) emphasize that selling to groups may reduce demand uncertainty (just as bundling
reduces it) and thus enable more pro￿table pricing. Parker & Alstyne (2005) consider the pricing
of complementary products in a model of two-sided markets. In our model, the complementary
products, content and platform, are o⁄ered in a single market.
Dropping the assumption of sharing in de￿ned groups, Conner & Rumelt (1991) and Takeyama
(1994) show that piracy can increase pro￿ts if the good exhibits a positive network externality.
Because piracy expands the user base, thus increasing the value of the good, the provider can
charge buyers higher prices than he could without piracy. Sundararajan (2004) considers the role
of digital management to restrict digital piracy in the context of an optimal pricing model. In his
model, the possibility of piracy acts as a constraint on the pricing policy, but there is no interaction
between the level of ￿ exibility and the implicit cost of piracy in terms of foregone sales.
In an intertemporal setting, Takeyama (1997) ￿nds that piracy among low-valuation consumers
can reduce the provider￿ s price-commitment problem if the good is durable over time. The negative
e⁄ect of piracy on the quality the provider o⁄ers for his goods is studied in an early paper by Novos
& Waldman (1984); they show that increased copyright protection raises the o⁄ered quality.
Regarding illegal online sharing of music, recent empirical studies by Oberholzer-Gee & Strumpf
(2004) and Rob & Waldfogel (2004) show a very limited e⁄ect of piracy on legal music sales.Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 7
2 Model
The digital good is demanded by a continuum of consumers on the unit interval [0;1]. The gross
utility of consumer i for a digital good is given by
vi ln(￿):





the ￿ exibility with which the digital good can be used by the consumer. In the most direct
interpretation, ￿ is the number of copies the consumer is allowed to make.
We begin our analysis with the case of homogeneous buyers, or vi = v for all i. We later extend
the analysis to heterogeneous consumers. In that case, we shall assume that vi = i and that the
agents are uniformly distributed on the unit interval.
The seller of the digital good determines the price p and the level of ￿ exibility ￿ at which it
sells the digital goods to the consumers. The level of ￿ exibility ￿ is the key choice variable in the
seller￿ s DRM design. For simplicity, we shall assume that the marginal cost of increasing ￿ exibility
is constant and equal to zero.3 The revenue of the seller is given by the product of the price p and
the sold quantity q 2 [0;1]. With zero marginal cost, the revenue is equal to the net pro￿t, i.e.,
￿ (p;q) = pq.
Each consumer i can purchase the digital good at the o⁄ered price p and ￿ exibility ￿. The net
utility of a purchase for consumer i is then
u(p;￿) = vi ln(￿) ￿ p.
We refer to the digital good that is purchased from the seller as a licensed product. Alternatively,
consumer i can attempt to receive an unlicensed copy of the digital good. We assume that unlicensed
copies can only be made from licensed ones, but our results easily extend to the case where they
can also be obtained from unlicensed ones. However, consumer i cannot be certain of receiving an
unlicensed copy. Let the probability that he receives an unlicensed copy be given by
￿￿q 2 [0;1].
The key idea is that the probability of receiving an unlicensed good is proportional to the number
q of licenses sold and the ￿ exibility ￿ with which they are sold.
3In the case of digital goods, the assumption of low marginal costs appears to be rather innocuous. We should
point out, however, that, in the presence of DRM technology, there is a sense in which the cost of providing ￿ exibility
may not be constant or even monotone increasing. It might be most di¢ cult technically to support intermediate
levels of ￿ exibility; very lenient or very strict DRM rules may be easier to implement.Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 8
The parameter ￿ represents the exogenous access rate to digital goods and characterizes the
permeability of the content-distribution environment, not the good itself. We consider ￿ to be
in￿ uenced by both technical and nontechnical factors, so increased permeability can result, e.g.,
from more lenient copyright law or less vigilant enforcement of existing copyright law, from more
lenient or more easily circumventable DRM, or from factors as higher Internet bandwidth or contact
frequency among consumers. For this reason, it will often be natural to think of consumers as being
heterogeneous with respect to ￿; for example, college students might have very di⁄erent access to
a variety of sharing technologies from, say, senior citizens with an interest in classical music.
The utility of a copy of the digital good is given by
uc (￿c) = vi ln￿c.
However, because consumer i cannot be certain of receiving an unlicensed copy, his expected utility
with respect to unlicensed access is given by:
￿￿q (vi ln￿c).
We choose this functional form for analytical convenience but plan to extend our results to more
general speci￿cations.
The level ￿c of ￿ exibility of an unlicensed copy may or may not be equal to the ￿ exibility
of a licensed copy. In one scenario, a consumer receives a music ￿le from a friend after the friend
authorizes him as a listener. In this case, the consumer lacks the ￿ exibility of authorizing additional
devices, which he would have if he owned an original. In other scenarios, the loss in utility could be
attributable to monetary costs of sharing or expected costs, such as the risk of ￿nes for copyright
infringement. In still other scenarios, an unlicensed copy of the digital good may have very few
constraints attached to it and this may lead to ￿c = ￿ ￿.
Finally, in the second part of the paper, we shall introduce the possibility of a platform (in
the form of a hardware device, a secure application program, or a secure hardware-software com-
bination) that is the only environment in which the content can be consumed. In this case, there
will be an additional product that the consumers need to acquire in order to be able to realize the
utility from the digital goods. Yet, this will not a⁄ect the basic elements of demand for digital
goods presented in the model.
3 Equilibrium Pricing
In this section we analyze the provision of ￿ exibility and the pricing policy by the content provider.
In Subsection 3.1 we start with the case of ex ante identical consumers. In Subsection 3.2 weFlexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 9
analyze the case of heterogeneous consumers and the element of di⁄erentiation will be the rate at
which consumers have access to unlicensed copies of the digital good.
3.1 Homogeneous Consumers
The value of the digital good is identical for each consumer and vi = v for all i. In the presence of
a ￿greynet,￿ a potential buyer can either acquire the digital good as a licensed product or obtain it
as an unlicensed copy. The probability of obtaining an unlicensed copy is increasing in the number
of licensed copies. With identical consumers, in equilibrium the net utility from the purchase of
a licensed product and the expected utility from a unlicensed copy will have to be equalized. We
denote by q 2 [0;1] the fraction of consumers who buy the digital good. In equilibrium, q is
determined such that each consumer is indi⁄erent between buying a licensed copy or trying to
acquire an unlicensed copy. The indi⁄erence between buying and copying is characterized by:
v ln￿ ￿ p = ￿￿q ln￿c: (1)
After we normalize the basic valuation to v = 1, the equilibrium indi⁄erence (1) allows us to





The demand for the digital good is decreasing in p and initially increasing but eventually decreasing
in ￿. The demand q (￿) as function of the ￿ exibility ￿ is single-peaked. The trade-o⁄ for the
seller is that, initially, an increase in ￿ exibility leads to a higher value of the product and hence
a higher demand. Yet, eventually, the marginal utility of any single consumer for ￿ exibility is
decreasing (though it remains positive), and hence it will increase the circulation of unsold copies
and ultimately lead to lower demand.
The revenue of the provider depends on the charged price p and the allowed ￿ exibility ￿, with:




Maximizing this pro￿t over p and ￿ leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium Price and Flexibility)




￿ln￿c ￿ 1, if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c;
1, if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c:Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 10




￿ln￿c; if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c;
e2; if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c:
3. The equilibrium sales volume q￿ is:
q￿ =
(
1; if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c;
1
￿e2 ln￿c; if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c:











1 ￿ ln￿ + p
￿￿2 ln￿c
= 0. (5)
Solving equation (4) for p and inserting it in equation (5), we obtain p = 1 and ￿ = e2, resulting
in the quantity q = 1
￿e2 ln￿c. Because the demand (2) is limited to q ￿ 1, the maximization is
constrained by q (p;￿) = 1 for ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c. Solving this restriction for p and inserting it in equation
(5), we obtain p = ￿ln(￿ln￿c) ￿ 1, ￿ = 1
￿ln￿c, and q = 1 for ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c.
In equilibrium, the outside option for every consumer, namely the expected utility ￿￿q ln￿c of
sharing the good instead of buying it, is constant.4
For small values of ￿, the provider optimally sells to all consumers. The existence of a ￿greynet￿
only presents a small threat to the sales volume of the provider. The provider completely compen-
sates for the threat of unlicensed copies by lowering his price. He also reduces the ￿ exibility from
the socially optimal level of ￿ exibility to reduce the expected bene￿t from obtaining an unlicensed
copy. The e⁄ect an increase in the permeability ￿ has on the outside option will therefore be
compensated for by reducing the allowed ￿ exibility. Because changes in the ￿ exibility also a⁄ect
the utility of the consumers who buy the good, the provider also varies the price, along with the
￿ exibility, in response to changes in permeability. For large ￿, this is obtained by setting price and
￿ exibility constant, in such a way that the decrease in quantity exactly o⁄sets every increase in
permeability.
Looking at the provider￿ s pro￿t, we can state the next proposition.
4The outside option ￿￿q ln￿c takes on the value ￿
1
￿ ln ￿c1ln￿c = 1, for ￿ <
1
e2 ln ￿c, and ￿e
2 1
￿e2 ln ￿c ln￿c = 1, for
￿ ￿
1
e2 ln ￿c; so ￿￿q ln￿c = 1 for all ￿.Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 11
Proposition 2 (Comparative Statics)
The equilibrium variables price p￿, ￿exibility ￿￿, and sales q￿ and the total revenue are decreasing
in ￿.
Proof. Inserting the optimal values of p and ￿ in the pro￿t function (3) yields pro￿t
￿ (￿) =
(
￿ln(￿ln￿c) ￿ 1 if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c
1
￿e2 ln￿c if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c
.




￿ln￿c if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c
￿ 1
￿2e2 ln￿c if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c
,
which is negative for all ￿ > 0.
3.2 Heterogeneous Consumers
Suppose now that consumers vary in their ability or propensity to obtain an unlicensed copy of the
digital good instead of buying a licensed copy. Then we should expect consumers with high ability
to rely on sharing and consumers with low ability to rely on buying. Let the individual ability to
share be ￿i, uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0;1]. This ability in￿ uences the probability
of receiving an unlicensed copy, which is now given by
￿i￿￿q:
With heterogeneous consumers, we are no longer working with a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Because consumers di⁄er in their outside option, those who have a large ability to share will do so,
while consumers with low ability will buy a licensed copy. The marginal consumer ￿ is de￿ned by
indi⁄erence between buying or trying to share:
u(p;￿) = ￿￿￿quc (￿c):
Again normalizing the basic valuation to v = 1, this indi⁄erence constraint now takes on the form
ln￿ ￿ p = ￿￿￿q ln￿c: (6)
All consumers with ability ￿i ￿ ￿ will buy a licensed copy; so the total quantity q that is sold is
equal to the marginal ability ￿. The demand function can then be derived from the indi⁄erence
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Using this demand function, the provider￿ s pro￿t, as a function of price and ￿ exibility, is





Pro￿t maximization now leads to the following result.
Proposition 3 (Heterogeneity)




￿ln￿c ￿ 1; if ￿ < 1
e3 ln￿c;
2; if ￿ ￿ 1
e3 ln￿c:




￿ln￿c; if ￿ < 1
e3 ln￿c;
e3; if ￿ ￿ 1
e3 ln￿c:
.





1; if ￿ < 1
e3 ln￿c; q
1
￿e3 ln￿c; if ￿ ￿ 1
e3 ln￿c:
.













p(p + 1 ￿ ln￿)
2￿
p
￿￿ln￿c (ln￿ ￿ p)
= 0. (9)
Solving equation (8) for p and inserting it in equation (9), we obtain p = 2 and ￿ = e3, resulting
in the quantity q =
q
1
￿e3 ln￿c. As above, demand is limited to q ￿ 1 for small ￿. Solving the
restriction q (p;￿) = 1 for p and inserting it in equation (9), the restricted values are obtained as
p = ￿ln(￿ln￿c) ￿ 1, ￿ = 1
￿ln￿c, and q = 1, for ￿ < 1
e3 ln￿c.
With heterogenous consumers, the seller is actively sorting the consumers into two market
segments. The user with a low ability to access unlicensed copies will buy the product from the
seller. As the probability of having access to unlicensed copies increases, consumers will eventually
￿nd it too expensive to buy the product and will attempt to obtain an unlicensed copy. For small
values of ￿, it will still be the case that all consumers buy a licensed copy (i.e., for ￿ < 1
e3 ln￿c),Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 13
and the seller will simply reduce price and ￿ exibility to entice the marginal buyer to purchase the
licensed product.
On the other hand, for higher levels of permeability ￿, some consumers will stop buying, and
the separation into buyers and sharers will arise in equilibrium. The equilibrium will now be de￿ned
through the marginal consumer characterized by the marginal ￿i. The provider￿ s choices of price
and ￿ exibility now ensure that the outside option of the marginal consumer is constant for all ￿.
Because the quantity varies with the permeability ￿, the marginal consumer also changes.
The second new aspect is that the provider now o⁄ers higher ￿ exibility and charges a higher
price for it. This becomes possible, because heterogeneity means that only the consumers with
low sharing ability, who have a low outside option, buy licensed copies. Therefore, the provider￿ s
trade-o⁄between ￿ exibility and price is loosened, resulting in a higher level of ￿ exibility at a higher
price.
A third aspect of consumer heterogeneity is that the critical ￿ is larger than with homogeneous
consumers. This implies that the permeability can be higher than it is in the case of homogeneous
consumers and that the provider can still sell to everybody.
4 Sales of Platforms for Digital Goods
In the presence of the ￿greynet,￿ the provider will not be able to capture the entire utility that the
consumers derive from the digital good. Because every consumer can always try to obtain unlicensed
copies instead of buying licensed ones, the provider is forced to leave this outside option as a rent
to all consumers. The provider of the digital good therefore faces the problem of recovering the
residual surplus from the consumer. A feasible and common strategy in digital-content distribution
is the provision of a platform on which to use the digital good. In the current section, we therefore
introduce a second product, a platform that is required in order to use the digital good. In the case
of digital-audio ￿les, the immediate examples include digital-music players such as Apple￿ s iPod or
Sony￿ s NetMD.
In economic terms, the platform constitutes a complimentary product to the digital good. In
Subsection 4.1, we ￿rst analyze the role of the platform in the context of a single ￿rm that sells
both the digital good and the platform. In other words, the seller has the property rights and
controls the prices of the digital content as well as the platform. In Subsection 4.2, we consider the
more realistic situation in which ownership of the platform and ownership of the digital good are
separate, as is the case in the digital music industry. In this case, a classic con￿ ict arises between
the platform provider and the content provider; this result sheds light on the recent positioning in
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4.1 Integrated Firm
In the case of an integrated ￿rm, the platform and the digital good are sold by the same ￿rm. In
the presence of a platform, even the consumers who own unlicensed copies of the digital good have
to buy the platform to consume the digital good. In other words, the platform does not create
any additional value for the buyer over and above the consumption of the digital good. It simply
represents a gatekeeper to the digital good. The platform owner can now recover the residual
surplus that the buyers obtained in the market for digital goods. Recall that, with homogenous
buyers and in equilibrium, every consumer received the same net utility ￿￿q ln￿c, whether he
bought or shared the digital good.
We denote by r the price of the platform. With the platform, the seller will attempt to recover
through r the residual surplus or rent that the consumers retained in section 3 because of the
greynet. In fact, the price of the platform will exactly re￿ ect the consumers￿willingness to pay for
the platform; so the provider will set the platform price at
r = ￿￿q ln￿c:
Suppose that the platform is sold at the same time as the digital good; so consumers who try to
obtain unlicensed copies don￿ t know yet whether they will be successful. Then all consumers will
buy the platform at price r, which equals their expected utility.
The choice between buying an unlicensed copy and trying to share is not changed by the
existence of the platform, and it is determined by the indi⁄erence constraint as above:
ln￿ ￿ p = ￿￿q ln￿c:
The question is how the provider will now set the ￿ exibility and price of the digital good in
order to maximize his pro￿t from sales of it and the platform.
Proposition 4 (Integrated Firm)
1. The equilibrium price of the platform is r￿ = ￿￿ ￿ln￿c.
2. The equilibrium price of the digital good is p￿ = ln ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ln￿c.
3. The equilibrium ￿exibility is ￿￿ = ￿ ￿.
Proof. Suppose the integrated ￿rm sets the above prices and ￿ exibility. At the price p￿ every
consumers are indi⁄erent between buying the digital good and trying to share, given that all other
consumers buy the good (q = 1). So the combination of p = p￿ and q = 1 is an equilibrium inFlexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 15
the digital-good market. This equilibrium leaves a rent of ￿￿ ￿ln￿c to every consumer through the
outside option provided buy the possibility of sharing. Since this rent is the consumers￿maximal
willingness to pay for the platform, the provider￿ s pro￿ts are maximized by setting the platform
price equal to r￿.
Given these prices and ￿ exibility ￿ = ￿ ￿, the total pro￿t of the integrated ￿rm is
pq + r =
￿
ln ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ln￿c
￿
1 + ￿￿ ￿ln￿c = ln ￿ ￿;
which is the maximum social surplus.
The price that the consumers are willing to pay for the platform equals the utility they derive
from being able to use the digital good. The provider therefore maximizes the utility from the
digital good by allowing full ￿ exibility and ensures that every consumer wants to buy the digital
good by setting a very low price. The provider then captures the entire consumer surplus by selling
the necessary platform and charging for it the total utility the consumers will derive from the digital
good.
From a social welfare point of view, the provision of digital good and platform by a single ￿rm
leads to the socially e¢ cient level of ￿ exibility, i.e., maximum ￿ exibility.
4.2 Separate Firms
Alternatively, the platform may be sold by a di⁄erent ￿rm from the one that sells the digital
good. Then the provider of the digital good will not take into account the e⁄ect of his ￿ exibility
and price on the pro￿t of the platform provider. This will lower the level of ￿ exibility o⁄ered
in equilibrium, but it is the equilibrium strategy for the content provider, because his revenue is
determined by the sale of the content rather than the platform. The timing of the pricing game is
as follows. The platform provider o⁄ers a price for the platform, the consumer makes his purchase
decision regarding the platform, then the content provider o⁄ers the digital ￿les and ￿nally the
consumer makes his purchase decision regarding the content. We now analyze the subgame perfect
equilibrium of the dynamic game.
Proposition 5 (Separate Firms)




￿ln￿c ￿ 1, if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c
1, if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c




￿ln￿c; if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c
e2; if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c
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2. The equilibrium sales volume q￿ of licensed copies sold is
q￿ =
(
1; if ￿ < 1
e2 ln￿c
1
￿e2 ln￿c; if ￿ ￿ 1
e2 ln￿c
:
3. The platform provider o⁄ers an equilibrium price r￿ = 1 and sells the platform to all con-
sumers.
Proof. As seen above, all consumers are left with the same rent ￿￿q ln￿c, which represents
their willingness to pay for the platform. Therefore, the platform provider maximizes his pro￿t by
charging the price r = ￿￿q ln￿c and selling the platform to all consumers.
Because all consumers buy the platform, the demand facing the digital-good provider is the
same as in the case without a platform. Thus, the behavior of the digital-good provider is given by
proposition 2.
The outside option is then ￿￿q ln￿c = 1, which determines the platform price r￿.
The digital-good provider restricts ￿ exibility to below the socially optimal level ￿ ￿. This is
caused by the con￿ ict of interest between the two providers. While increasing ￿ exibility has a
purely positive e⁄ect on the pro￿t of the platform provider (because it increases the value of access
to the digital good), the digital-good provider faces the trade-o⁄ between increasing the value of
licensed copies and restricting the availability of unlicensed ones.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided an elementary analysis of the role ￿ exibility and platform play in DRM.
The basic model showed that the optimal use of ￿ exibility displays an important trade-o⁄ between
providing a higher value to paying customers and increasing the likelihood of distribution through
channels other than legitimate sales. We then showed that a platform for the digital goods may
lead to a socially bene￿cial improvement in the design of the ￿ exibility rules if digital good and
platform are owned by the same seller. However, if digital good and platform are complementary
goods, but o⁄ered and priced by di⁄erent sellers (as is the case for music ￿les), then a con￿ ict over
the optimal ￿ exibility rule emerges again.
Our basic model had a number of simplifying features. Clearly, the analysis will have to be
extended to better understand the emerging market structure and security provisions for digital
goods. In many instances, content is available in many forms. Music, for example, is distributed
through radio, TV, CDs, and digital copying. Because the demand for music in each market
segment interacts with the other segments, the distribution and management policies will naturallyFlexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 17
be dependent on the structure of the other market segments. We began with a single provider and
a single platform, and it is logical to ask how DRM would be a⁄ected by competing providers and
platforms.
On the demand side, it seems natural to think about the intensity of demand for digital goods
and the ease with which unlicensed copies can be obtained. The music industry￿ s concern about ￿le
sharing by students in college dormitories clearly arises in part from the fact that their best cus-
tomers in terms of sales volume are the ones that have the best technology for accessing unlicensed
copies.
Finally, as soon as ￿ exibility becomes an issue, more sophisticated pricing strategies seem nat-
ural. In this paper, we focused on the single-￿le pricing policy, but other plans are clearly being
used or conceived to ￿nd an optimal trade-o⁄. For example, monthly fees for limited or unlimited
access to databases of music ￿les are alternatives to single-￿le transactions.Flexibility in Digital Rights Management April 7, 2005 18
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